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THE GAME OF RICO: A POWERFUL
PROSECUTORIAL TOOL VERSUS STRICT
LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2018, six members of the Black Souls street gang
were sentenced to natural life in prison after a single trial convicted
them of violating Illinois’ Street Gang and Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Law (Illinois RICO).1 These were the first, and
to date only, convictions returned at trial under Illinois RICO, en-
acted in 2012.2 This Comment will examine how Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutes, often viewed as a
powerful prosecutorial tool, can be strictly limited by legislative
intent.
This Comment will provide a background on the federal RICO and
its expansion and adoption by state governments. Part I looks specifi-
cally at New York’s state level RICO statute. Part I also provides a
background on the context of gang violence in Illinois and the intro-
duction and passing of Illinois’ RICO statute.
Part II examines Illinois’ RICO statute through its legislative his-
tory and demonstrates how it was designed to be a stricter interpreta-
tion of the federal RICO Act. Next, Part II compares Illinois’ RICO
statute with the original federal RICO Act enacted on October 15,
1970, and a similar state enacted RICO statute, New York’s Organ-
ized Crime Control Act (OCCA) enacted on November 1, 1986. This
comparison focuses on key RICO elements and how the definitions of
these elements alter the impact of RICO prosecutions.
Part III of this Comment suggests that Illinois trial courts should
look to other state court interpretations of similarly enacted state
RICO statutes that are more closely constructed to Illinois’ RICO
statute than the federal RICO Act. This Part further suggests that be-
cause Illinois’ RICO statute is similar in structure, design, and legisla-
tive history and intent to New York’s OCCA, it can be instructive to
1. Rosemary Sobol, Life in Prison for Black Souls Gang Leaders Convicted in Cook County’s
First Test of State RICO Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2018) https://www.chicagotribune
.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-black-souls-gang-leaders-sentenced-20180601-story.html.
2. Id.
827
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look to the OCCA for possible persuasive guidance and what to ex-
pect from Illinois’ RICO statute in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a background on the federal RICO Act and its
expansion and adoption by state governments. Next, this Part looks
specifically at New York’s state level RICO statute. Finally, this Part
provides a background on the context of gang violence in Illinois and
the introduction and passing of Illinois’ RICO statute.
A. Federal RICO—The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act
By the 1950s the U.S. Government began to understand the impact
the Italian Mafia had on the country, both financially and in terms of
sheer criminality.3 Due to lack of legislation, for the next two decades
the Department of Justice struggled to prosecute such complex crimi-
nal organizations.4 Federal prosecutors were forced to prosecute
members of the mafia one by one, without the ability to dismantle
such complex criminal organizations.5 As a result, highly sophisticated
criminal organizations spread and weaved their way into American
society and extracted billions of dollars annually from the country’s
economy.6
On October 15, 1970, RICO was signed into law with the intention
to eradicate organized crime in the United States.7 RICO allowed the
government to prosecute individuals who were involved in criminal
enterprises, like the mafia or street gangs, which worked together as a
unit.8 No longer being forced to prosecute members of organized
crime one by one, RICO allowed the government to present a crimi-
nal enterprise’s complete criminal history, even if those acts were
committed by a variety of individuals. Robert Mueller, then Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Criminal Di-
vision, explained in 1991 that “RICO gives you the ability to pull to-
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STAFF OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME AND GANG SECTION, CRIMINAL
RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, at 4 (6th ed. 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/file/870856/download [hereinafter CRIMINAL RICO
MANUAL].
4. See A. Laxmidas Sawkar, From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion, 41
ARIZ. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1999).
5. Id.
6. CRIMINAL RICO MANUAL, supra note 3, at 4–5.
7. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1970).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–1963 (§ 1962 describes the “prohibited activities” while § 1963
prescribes the criminal penalties enforceable for violations of § 1962).
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gether the various criminal acts committed by various persons in an
organization (and present them) in one courtroom—before one jury
and one judge. . . . Both the jury and the judge understand the scope
of criminal activity.”9
Under the federal RICO Act a person commits the crime of federal
racketeering when he does or conspires to: (a) use income received
from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an
enterprise, (b) acquire an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, or (c) conduct or participate in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.10
The federal definition of enterprise is found in § 1961(4) of the fed-
eral RICO Act, stating that the term enterprise “includes any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity.”11 This definition of enterprise is non-inclusive and has
been left to the federal courts to interpret. Broad in scope, it includes
any association of a group of individuals, legally recognized or not,
involved in either legitimate or illegitimate businesses.12
The Supreme Court has held that an association-in-fact enterprise is
“a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of en-
gaging in a course of conduct” and “is proved by evidence of an ongo-
ing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit.”13
After successful RICO prosecutions against the mafia, federal pros-
ecutors began using RICO as a tool against street gangs. In United
States v. Andrews, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found an enterprise to exist where the defendants
were members of the El Rukn Street gang in Chicago and were en-
gaged in illegal narcotics trafficking.14 Over time, federal case law has
developed to require that the enterprise element be built around a
group of members that demonstrate three characteristics: “(1) com-
mon or shared purpose; (2) some continuity of structure and person-
9. Ronald J. Ostrow, COLUMN ONE: The Mob Against the Ropes: Prosecutors Using New
Laws Are Cracking Omerta— the Code of Silence—to Jail Hoodlums. the Mafia Is Still an Omi-
nous Criminal Force, but Has Lost Much Power, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1991), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1991-02-09/news/mn-658_1_criminal-division.
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
12. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581–82 (1981).
13. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944–45 (2009) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 583).
14. Robert Blau & John O’Brian, Rise And Fall Of El Rukn-Jeff Fort’s Evil Empire, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Sept. 8, 1991), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-09-08-9103070697-
story.html; United States v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1517 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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nel; and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in
the conduct of a pattern of racketeering.”15 For example, in the case
of the El Rukn gang, that common or shared purpose would be illegal
narcotics trafficking.
An enterprise associated-in-fact has been held to mean, “simply a
continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.”16 The struc-
ture of a formal enterprise is not required.17 In terms of street gangs,
the Seventh Circuit has stated that, “in informal organizations such as
criminal groups, there ‘must be some structure, to distinguish an en-
terprise from a mere conspiracy, but there need not be much.’”18
Controlling federal caselaw holds that “The enterprise is an en-
tity . . . associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a
course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is . . . a series of
criminal acts as defined by the statute . . . . The existence of an enter-
prise . . . remains a separate element . . . .”19 The common purpose of
an enterprise does not have to be anything more or separate to com-
mitting a pattern of criminal activity.20
The federal RICO Act states a “‘pattern of racketeering activity’
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity” within ten years.21
Additionally, the two acts of racketeering activity must be related, and
“either constitute or threaten long-term criminal activity.”22
The federal RICO Act has been used several times to prosecute
violent street gangs in Chicago.23 In 2017, a jury convicted six mem-
bers of the Hobos street gang in Chicago of federal RICO violations.24
The jury found the six Hobo gang members committed eight murders
in the span of ten years, along with kidnappings, robberies, and at-
tempted murders.25 The amount of gang violence had not been al-
leged against a single gang since the El Rukn trial noted above.26
15. United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982).
16. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948.
17. United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
20. Id.
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
22. Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1151.
23. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. No. 33, at 14 (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans97/09700033.pdf [hereinafter Ill. H. Transcription Deb.].
24. Jason Meisner, Jury convicts reputed leaders of Hobos ‘super gang’ for 8 killings, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-hobos-gang-ver
dict-met-20170104-story.html.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Recently, four members of the Goonie Boss faction were indicted
for federal RICO charges alleging that the gang had carried out ten
murders, six attempted murders, and two assaults during a “three-year
reign of terror” in the Englewood neighborhood between 2014 and
2016.27 In a troubling illustration of gang violence in Chicago, the four
members were not charged with exerting violence to protect turf or a
narcotics trade, but for using violence to “simply boost their social
media brand.”28
B. States Begin to Follow—The Expansion of RICO
Once the federal RICO Act was enacted in 1970, states quickly fol-
lowed by enacting their own RICO statutes—with the first state
RICO statute becoming effective in 1972.29 By the late 1980s over
twenty-eight states had their own RICO statutes, generally modeled
after the federal version.30 In constructing their statutes the majority
of states expanded on the federal RICO Act and attempted to create
statutes that were broader in “language, scope, and intended criminal
targets.”31
However, a minority of states have enacted statutes that resemble
the federal RICO Act at a quick glance but are actually much more
limited in scope and designed to target a very specific type of criminal
activity. Whether broad or narrow, proponents of state RICO legisla-
tion argue that state RICO statutes should be enacted by states, in
addition to the federal RICO Act, for four main reasons.32
First, federal RICO prosecutions of criminal entities are often re-
served for larger and more sophisticated criminal enterprises.33 When
looking at curbing violence and implementing effective deterrence, it
would be more beneficial for states to have the discretion to prosecute
a higher number of smaller criminal entities rather than wait for
fewer, but larger, organizations to be prosecuted by federal authori-
ties.34 Ideally, a state RICO statute should work cohesively with the
federal RICO Act, with contribution from both local and federal au-
27. Jason Meisner & Annie Sweeney, ‘It was killing for the sake of killing’: Feds charge South
Side gang faction in 10 killings in Englewood, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-englewood-gang-murders-20181024-story.html.
28. Id.
29. Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1143.
30. Id. at 1143–44.
31. Jason D. Reichelt, Stalking the Enterprise Criminal: State RICO and the Liberal Interpreta-
tion of the Enterprise Element, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 224, 237 (1995).
32. Id. at 230–31.
33. Id. at 231.
34. Id.
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thorities. This would allow federal authorities to focus on larger, more
well-developed criminal entities, while at the same time state authori-
ties can track and prosecute a larger number of smaller criminal
entities.
Second, in states without RICO statutes, state agencies would be
put in the position of turning their case over to federal authorities or
simply charging the underlying individual criminal acts.35 Steven Kess-
ler, a former New York state prosecutor, noted that in states without
RICO statutes, “state authorities were compelled to surrender their
cases to federal authorities for prosecution under federal law.”36 Ad-
ditionally, it has been argued that federal authorities generally would
not bring RICO charges if a criminal entity’s predicate acts consisted
of only state offenses.37 David Frohnmayer, Oregon’s former Attor-
ney General, further explained that “[w]ithout state RICOs, the posi-
tion taken by federal prosecutors with regard to use of the federal
RICO would essentially leave criminals free from prosecution under
federal RICO so long as they avoided commission of federal predicate
offenses.”38
Third, state agencies are typically more knowledgeable regarding
local criminal entities.39 Local law enforcement is generally better
suited for investigations into local criminal entities given their ties to
the community, continuity in information gathering, and the amount
of officers and detectives at their disposal.40 Most effective are task
forces that pool together resources from federal authorities with local
law enforcement. State prosecutors across the country have reported
that one advantage to prosecuting under state RICO statutes is its
potential for more severe sentencing.41 RICO allows prosecutors to
combine a number of minor criminal offenses, which on their own
would not allow such sentencing, but together, can warrant stiffer pen-
alties. At least one prosecutor’s office has reported that its state
RICO statute was successful in curbing street gang “turf wars.”42
35. Id. at 232.
36. Id. at 233.
37. Reichelt, supra note 31, at 233.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 232.
40. See id.
41. Donald J. Rebovich, Kenneth R. Coyle & John C. Schaaf, Local Prosecution of Organized
Crime: The Use of State RICO Statutes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at 9 (Oct. 1993), https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/143502NCJRS.pdf [hereinafter Rebovich et al.].
42. Id. at 12.
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Finally, state RICO statutes are typically accompanied with eviden-
tiary advantages.43 For example, by consolidating several predicate
acts, prosecutors can illustrate to a jury the larger picture of the crimi-
nal entity.44 The jury can be shown the forest, and not simply
presented tree by tree.
C. New York’s Version
On November 1, 1986, New York enacted its version of the federal
RICO Act as the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA).45 The Act
was created in the context of New York’s history with organized crime
in the 1980s46, similar to Chicago’s struggle with gang violence today.
However, New York’s legislature was unwilling to enact a statute with
the breadth of the federal RICO Act.47 New York’s OCCA was thus
limited by strictly defining its terms and objectives to target the spe-
cific criminal activity it had in mind—organized crime—by creating
the crime of enterprise corruption.48 The legislature chose to focus on
criminal enterprises “because their sophistication and organization
make them more effective at their criminal purposes and because
their structure and insulation protect their leadership from detection
and prosecution.”49 By creating the crime of enterprise corruption,
New York’s legislature aimed to “draft a narrower and more precise
statute than RICO” and attempted to “avoid the wide scope and
sweep of RICO.”50 A person commits the crime of enterprise corrup-
tion when:
[1] that person is employed by or associated with a criminal enter-
prise, knowing of the criminal enterprise’s existence and the nature
of its activities, and [2] (a) that person intentionally conducts or par-
ticipates in the affairs of an enterprise by participating in a pattern
of criminal activity, or (b) intentionally acquires or maintains any
interest in or control of an enterprise, by participating in a pattern
of criminal activity, or (c) participates in a pattern of criminal activ-
ity and knowingly invests any of the proceeds of the criminal activ-
ity or of the investment of those proceeds, in an enterprise.51
43. Reichelt, supra note 31, at 232.
44. Id. at 232.
45. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2008); see also Sawkar, supra
note 4, at 1150.
46. See Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1150.
47. Id. (citing People v. Capaldo, 572 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (Sup. Ct. 1991)).
48. Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1146 & n.95.
49. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2008).
50. Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1150 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00–460.80 and People v.
Capaldo, 572 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (1991)).
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney1986 & Supp. 2008).
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One of OCCA’s authors, Assembly Member Melvin H. Miller,
wrote that the severe penalties provided by OCCA, “should be re-
served for those who not only commit crimes, but do so as part of an
organized criminal enterprise.”52 New York courts have explained
that “the standard for proving enterprise corruption was higher than
the federal statute’s counterpart because the scope of New York’s act
was defined more rigorously.”53
New York defines a criminal enterprise as a “group of persons shar-
ing a common purpose of engaging in criminal conduct associated in
an ascertainable structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activity,
and with a continuity of existence, structure and criminal purpose be-
yond the scope of individual criminal incidents.”54 A New York court
explained:
A team of people who unite to carry out a single crime or a brief
series of crimes may lack structure and criminal purpose beyond the
criminal actions they carry out; such an ad hoc group is not a crimi-
nal enterprise. If a group persists, however, in the form of a ‘struc-
tured, purposeful criminal organization’, beyond the time required
to commit individual crimes, the continuity element of criminal en-
terprise is met.55
This narrowly tailored definition therefore requires that a defen-
dant must knowingly belong to a criminal enterprise and have the in-
tent to advance or participate in the furtherance of the criminal
enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity. In other words, the
law only applies to persons employed by or associated with criminal
enterprises. “This significant modification from RICO represents an
effort by the state legislatures ‘to protect against abuse and undue
prejudice to defendants.’”56 In the approval of OCCA, the Gover-
nor’s Memorandum stated:
The reach of the [law] is not limited to traditional organized crime
families or crime syndicates; rather, it includes any group with a
shared criminal purpose and a continuity of existence and structure.
Crimes committed by individuals who engage in a brief series of
criminal acts in a[n] ad hoc and unstructured group are not subject
to prosecution under the Act. If, however, the group demonstrates a
52. Sawkar, supra note 4, at 1145–46 & n.92 (citing Letter from Melvin H. Miller, Chair, New
York Committee on Codes, to Evan A. Davis, counsel to the Governor (July 16, 1986), quoted in
People v. Yarmy, 171 Misc. 2d 13, 16 (N.Y. 1996).
53. Id. at 1146 & n.95 (citing Yarmy, 171 Misc. 2d. at 16).
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(3) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2008).
55. People v. Keschner, 25 N.Y.3d 704, 720 (2015).
56. Steven L. Kessler, And a Little Child Shall Lead Them: New York’s Organized Crime
Control Act of 1986, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 797, 802 (1990) (citing Governor’s Memorandum on
Approval of ch. 516, N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (July 24, 1986), reprinted in N.Y. Laws 3175 (Mc-
Kinney) (1986)).
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structure—such as the hierarchy of a ‘Cosa Nostra’ family, or the
specialization of a narcotics, loansharking or gambling operation,
the criminal enterprise requirement is satisfied.57
Further separating itself from the federal RICO Act, New York’s
OCCA requires three separate predicate acts that are not “isolated
incidents nor so closely related and connected in point of time or cir-
cumstance of commission as to constitute a [single] criminal
offense.”58
D. Background in Illinois
Chicago is home to over seventy different gangs and over 150,000
gang members.59 Gang violence in Illinois, especially within and
around Chicago, is vastly disproportionate to other comparable states
and cities. In 2017, Chicago had 650 homicides, more than New York
City and Los Angeles combined, with a population three times smaller
than New York City and almost twice as small as Los Angeles.60 The
vast majority of those homicides were gang related.61 Violence is a
quick result of any perceived disrespect, which, due to gang members’
activity on social media platforms, can spread citywide in seconds.62 In
2018, one summer weekend in Chicago resulted in over seventy-four
people being shot.63
One reason for this violence is that within Illinois, gangs have splin-
tered, creating smaller groups and increasing violence.64 Between
2009 and 2012, there was a twenty-five percent increase in gang activ-
ity.65 These smaller groups have been much harder to find responsible
and to successfully prosecute.66 Additionally, these smaller gangs have
been less likely to be selected for prosecution by the federal govern-
57. Id. at 809 (citing Governor’s Memorandum on Approval of ch. 516, N.Y. Laws (McKin-
ney) (July 24, 1986), reprinted in N.Y. Laws 3175 (McKinney) (1986)).
58. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(4)(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2008).
59. Chicago Most Gang-Infested City in U.S., Officials Say, NBC CHICAGO (Jan. 26, 2012),
https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-crime-commision-gang-book-138174334.html.
60. Michael Tarm, Social Media Altering Chicago Street-gang Culture, Fueling Violence, CHI-
CAGO SUN TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/social-media-street-chica
go-gang-culture-fueling-violence/.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Editorial Board, Chicago’s Great Shame, Chicago’s Crisis: Blood on the Streets, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-vio
lence-chicago-gangs-police-20180806-story.html.
64. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 26.
65. Ma’ayan Rosenzweig, “Hidden America: Don’t Shoot I Want to Grow Up”: Statistics Sur-
rounding Gang Violence in Chicago, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/fullpage/chi
cago-gang-violence-numbers-17509042 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
66. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 26.
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ment under its RICO Act.67 The primary issue Illinois faced was its
inability to tie gang leaders to the actual members of the gang who
committed the crime. In other words, gang leaders were being acquit-
ted because Illinois was unable to link the people who ordered the
crimes to those who actually committed the crimes.68
E. Illinois’ Version of RICO
As a result of the devastating gang violence in Chicago, and Illinois
as a whole, a RICO statute was proposed by several Illinois State’s
Attorneys with the desired purpose of fixing the missing links in the
prosecution of street gangs.69 It was argued that Illinois’ lack of such
law was one reason for the disproportionate amount of gang violence
within Illinois, and such a law was “necessary to protect the citizens
from crime.”70
With the local prosecutor’s ability to bring these charges, as op-
posed to waiting for the federal government to decide whom and
when it wanted to prosecute, such a statute would provide a place in
state courts for these charges. Thus, the state prosecutor’s ability to
bring RICO charges, as opposed to waiting for the federal govern-
ment to decide whom and when it wanted to prosecute, would serve as
both a crime fighting tool and as a deterrent to future gang violence.71
Former Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez, who helped au-
thor and support the statute, stated:
For the first time in the history of our state, this new law will give
local prosecutors the tools to identify and address patterns in multi-
ple gang-related offenses and join different offenses and offenders
into a single court proceeding. . . .This new law will require funda-
mental changes in the way state prosecutors approach gang crimes
because racketeering has not existed under Illinois law in any mean-
ingful shape or form.72
State’s Attorney Alvarez further stated that “the goal is to attack
the city’s gang problem by going after ‘the guys who are calling the
shots’” and noted that, at the time, thirty-one other states had state
67. Id.
68. Id. at 25–26.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 26.
72. Matthew Lynch, New Gang Law Blows into the Windy City, Causing a Backlash in Illinois,
HUFFPOST (June 30, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/chicago-gangs-rico-laws_b_1631584?
utm_hp_ref=black-voices.
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RICO statutes.73 Fellow Illinois State’s Attorney for Sangamon
County John Milhiser was quoted:
The intent is to allow law enforcement to go after leaders, those on
the higher end who are calling the shots. . . . We’ll continue to pros-
ecute lower-level drug dealers and other such criminals. But if we
are able to identify an organization that’s involved, we’ll use this
tool to go after those higher-level individuals.74
In 2013, then Chicago Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy refer-
enced New York’s OCCA, stating that during his tenure in New York,
similar measures to the Illinois RICO statute were used and allowed
the police to “penetrate the veil of secrecy” surrounding gang leaders
insulation from prosecution.75 Regarding Illinois’ RICO statute, Mc-
Carthy further stated, “We’re going to use this a lot.”76 It was McCar-
thy’s opinion that once gang leaders realized that violence was bad for
business, they would change their culture and resort to less violent
means.77
In 2012, then Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law the Illi-
nois RICO statute.78 The Illinois RICO statute was enacted on June
11, 2012 and had a sunset clause for its repeal on June 11, 2017—five
years after it became law.79 In June 2017, the statute was renewed for
another five years, with a repeal date of June 11, 2022.80
Illinois’ RICO statute gave prosecutors more discretion and the
new ability to prosecute gang leaders for the actions of their mem-
bers.81 Numerous Chicago area gangs have been successfully prose-
cuted under the federal RICO Act.82 However, Illinois’ own police
and prosecutors did not previously have access to this tool.83
The Illinois RICO statute, for the first time, allowed state prosecu-
tors to indict and prosecute gangs and their members as criminal en-
73. Quinn Signs New State Law To Target Street Gangs, CBS CHICAGO (June 11, 2012), https:/
/chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/06/11/quinn-signs-new-state-law-to-target-street-gangs/.
74. Chris Dettro, State RICO Law Unlikely to Be Used Much in Central Illinois, THE STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER (June 17, 2012), https://www.sj-r.com/article/20120617/NEWS/306179950.
75. New State ‘RICO’ Law Leads to Street Gang Arrests, CBS CHICAGO (June 13, 2013),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/06/13/new-state-rico-law-leads-to-sreet-gang-arrests/
76. Busting criminal gangs through RICO, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 22, 2013), https://www
.chicagotribune.com/opinion/ct-xpm-2013-06-22-ct-edit-rico-0622-20130622-story.html.
77. Id.
78. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G (2012 & Supp. 2019); see also Quinn Signs New State Law To
Target Street Gangs, supra note 73.
79. H.B. 2969, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
80. Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-9 (2012 & Supp. 2019).
81. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 14–15.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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terprises.84 State prosecutors were able to combine a number of
predicate offenses and prosecute the principals involved, not just the
gang members who committed the underlying criminal acts.85
Under the Illinois RICO statute, prosecutors must prove three
things: (1) that the gang exists; (2) that there is gang activity, such as
initiations or meetings; and (3) that the gang is involved in at least
three types of crime, such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, or murder.86
Illinois’ RICO statute also affects sentencing for gang members.
Even if a gang member was not involved in any specific criminal acts,
they can be sentenced up to thirty years if they are found to have been
a key player in the gang.87 Sentences can reach to natural life if the
criminal enterprise involves murders.88
Because the Illinois RICO statute is a direct response to Chicago’s
gang violence and is designed to protect the public from the pervasive
violence committed by street gangs and other criminal enterprises,89 it
excludes investigations into other types of organizations, such as
white-collar crime, public corruption, and unions.90
II. ANALYSIS
This Part first examines Illinois’ RICO statute through its legislative
history and demonstrates how it was designed to be a stricter interpre-
tation of the federal RICO Act. Next, this Part compares Illinois’
RICO statute with the original federal RICO Act and a similar state
enacted RICO statute, New York’s OCCA. This comparison focuses
on key RICO elements and how the definitions of these elements alter
the impact of RICO prosecutions.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. Timothy Bella, Will Illinois RICO Law ‘with Teeth’ Help Chicago?, ALJAZEERA AMERICA
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/
2013/8/22/chicago-s-gang-violencewillillinoisricolawwithteethhelp.html.
87. Andy Grimm, Black Souls Gang Members Head to Trial on RICO Charges, CHICAGO SUN
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/black-souls-gang-members-head-to-
trial-on-rico-charges/.
88. Id.
89. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-2 (2012 & Supp. 2019).
90. Sophia Tareen, Gov. Quinn Signs Street Gang RICO Act, PANTAGRAPH (June 11, 2012),
https://www.pantagraph.com/news/state-and-regional/illinois/gov-quinn-signs-street-gang-rico-
act/article_4a65a04a-b400-11e1-9b26-001a4bcf887a.html; Ill. S. Transcript, 97th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. No. 122, at 108 (May 25, 2012), http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/097001
22.pdf [hereinafter Ill. S. Transcript].
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A. Illinois’ Legislative History
While the federal RICO Act was drafted by G. Robert Blakey in
the late 1960s, Blakey’s son Jack Blakey, along with then Cook
County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez, drafted Illinois’ RICO stat-
ute.91 While the authors of the two RICO statutes share familiar
bloodlines, there are stark contrasts in the structure, design, and legis-
lative history and intent between the two statutes.
Illinois belongs in the minority of states that have enacted statutes
that may resemble the federal RICO Act at a quick glance, but in
application are much more limited in scope, and are designed to target
a very specific type of criminal activity. Illinois’ RICO statute is nar-
rower than those enacted by the majority of states in several ways and
is “not a broad and overreaching Bill that historically has been associ-
ated with the term ‘RICO.’”92
Through Illinois’ RICO statute, the Illinois legislature intended to
target the leaders of violent street gangs.93 These street gangs are
viewed as a criminal enterprise.94 In a departure from the federal
RICO Act, the Illinois legislature required that an enterprise “have an
ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a
pattern of predicate activity,”95 meaning the enterprise must be dis-
tinct from the criminal activity itself. The criminal activity alone can-
not create the enterprise.
Further distancing itself from the federal RICO Act, Illinois’ RICO
statute includes language that states a prosecutor must show a defen-
dant intentionally participated in the operation or management of an
enterprise.96 The legislative intent is clear—that unlike the wide
breadth of the federal RICO Act, Illinois’ RICO statute was designed
to give prosecutors “a tool to target criminal enterprises and specifi-
cally target the organizers and leaders of those criminal enterprises by
proving that individuals within the enterprise have engaged in a pat-
tern of criminal list of—predicate offenses.”97 The primary elements
of an Illinois RICO violation are determined by the definitions of
three key terms: operation or management, enterprise, and pattern of
predicate activity.
91. Bella, supra note 86.
92. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 17.
93. Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 108.
94. Id.
95. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(b)(2)(C) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
96. Id. 5/33G-4(a).
97. Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 108.
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1. The Requisite Elements
(a) It is unlawful for any person, who intentionally participates in
the operation or management of an enterprise, directly or indirectly,
to:
(1) knowingly do so, directly or indirectly, through a pattern of
predicate activity;
(2) knowingly cause another to violate this Article; or
(3) knowingly conspire to violate this Article.
. . . .
(b) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, through a pattern of predicate activity any in-
terest in, or control of, to any degree, any enterprise, real property,
or personal property of any character, including money.98
a. Operation and Management
The Illinois legislature decided to depart from the federal RICO
Act and create an operation and management test to limit the scope
of Illinois’ RICO statute due to fear of putting such a “broad tool in
the hands of not just the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, but
the other hundreds and one State’s [A]ttorneys throughout the State
who are not politically elected.”99
The Illinois legislature defines the terms operation or management
as “directing or carrying out the enterprise’s affairs and is limited to
any person who knowingly serves as a leader, organizer, operator,
manager, director, supervisor, financier, advisor, recruiter, supplier, or
enforcer of an enterprise in violation of this Article.”100 The most no-
table difference in this language from that of the federal RICO Act is
the added mens rea requirement of “knowingly.” By adding this mens
rea requirement, Illinois insured that only those who knowingly ad-
vance an enterprise through their pattern of predicate activity would
be subject to criminal liability provided by Illinois’ RICO statute.
b. Enterprise
Illinois’ definition of enterprise includes: “(1) any partnership, cor-
poration, association, business or charitable trust, or other legal entity;
and (2) any group of individuals or other legal entities, or any combi-
nation thereof, associated in fact although not itself a legal entity.”101
Both licit and illicit enterprises are included under Illinois’ definition
98. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-4(a)–(b) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
99. Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 111 (quoting Sen. Raoul).
100. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(d) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
101. Id. 5/33G-3(b)(1)-(2).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 15  7-MAY-20 12:21
2020] THE GAME OF RICO 841
of the term.102 The legislature further explained that “[a]n association
in fact must be held together by a common purpose of engaging in a
course of conduct, and it may be associated together for purposes that
are both legal and illegal.”103 The legislature included a three-part test
to establish an association-in-fact, stating that:
An association in fact must:
(A) have an ongoing organization or structure, either formal or
informal;
(B) the various members of the group must function as a contin-
uing unit, even if the group changes membership by gaining or
losing members over time; and
(C) have an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in
the conduct of a pattern of predicate activity.104
The obvious legislative target of Illinois’ RICO statute, street gangs,
are considered associations in fact. To establish that a street gang is an
association in fact, prosecutors must prove three things: (A) that the
gang exists; (B) that there is gang activity, such as initiations or meet-
ings; and (C) that the gang is involved in at least three types of crime,
such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, or murder.105
c. Pattern of Predicate Activity
With the fear of a such a broad tool being misused by state prosecu-
tors, the Illinois legislature again departed from the federal RICO Act
through the requirement and definition of a “pattern of predicate ac-
tivity.”106 In 2012, while discussing House Bill 1907 (the Illinois RICO
statute), then Senator Kwame Raoul, and now Attorney General of
Illinois, stated:
We’ve limited the predicate activity to actual acts, actual acts, and
deleted references to attempt, conspiracy, endeavor, and solicita-
tion. We’ve raised the threshold of predicate activity to include
Class 2 felonies or higher  . . . . We require that the prosecutor prove
three—the three predicate offenses, as opposed to two, and require
that the predicate offenses take place within three years of each
other, as opposed to ten years. So, we’re—it’s a—an extreme
narrowing . . . .107
Illinois defines a pattern of predicate activity as (1) “at least [three]
occurrences of predicate activity that are in some way related to each
other and that have continuity between them, and that are separate
102. Id.
103. Id. 5/33G-3(b)(2).
104. Id. 5/33G-3(b)(2)(A)–(C).
105. Bella, supra note 86.
106. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(f) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
107. Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 111 (quoting Sen. Raoul).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-MAY-20 12:21
842 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:827
acts . . . and (2) which occurs after the effective date of [Illinois’ RICO
statute], and the last of which falls within [three] years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the first occurrence of predicate activ-
ity.”108 The statute states: “Acts are related to each other if they are
not isolated events, including if they have similar purposes, or results,
or participants, or victims, or are committed a similar way, or have
other similar distinguishing characteristics, or are part of the affairs of
the same enterprise.”109 The statute further states: “There is con-
tinuity between acts if they are ongoing over a substantial period, or if
they are part of the regular way some entity does business or conducts
its affairs.”110
In contrast to the federal RICO Act which only requires two predi-
cate acts and up to ten years between acts,111 Illinois requires that
three predicate acts occur after June 11, 2012 (the statute’s enact-
ment), and that the last predicate act occurs within three years of the
first predicate act.112
d. Statutory Safeguards
In addition to the narrowed definitions and heightened level of re-
quirements to warrant a prosecution under Illinois’ RICO statute, the
legislature built in additional statutory safeguards.113 The Illinois’
RICO statute requires that the State’s Attorney for a county, “or a
person designated by law to act for him or her and to perform his or
her duties during his or her absence or disability, may authorize a
criminal prosecution under this Article.”114 Therefore, a prosecutor
must get the approval of the elected State’s Attorney for her county
before she files RICO charges against a defendant.
Before a State’s Attorney can authorize a criminal RICO prosecu-
tion, she must “adopt rules and procedures governing the investiga-
tion and prosecution of any offense enumerated” by Illinois’ RICO
statute.115 Additionally, the rules and procedures adopted require any
protentional prosecution under the RICO statute “be subject to an
internal approval process in which it is determined, in a written prose-
cution memorandum prepared by the State’s Attorney’s Office.”116
108. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(f)(1)–(2) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
109. Id. 5/33G-3(f)(1).
110. Id. 5/33G-3(f)(1).
111. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(f)(2) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
113. Id. 5/33G-4(f).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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This memorandum must include that the prosecution “is necessary to
ensure that the indictment adequately reflects the nature and extent
of the criminal conduct involved in a way that prosecution only on the
underlying predicate activity would not . . .”117 and “a prosecution
under this Article would provide the basis for an appropriate sentence
under all the circumstances of the case in a way that a prosecution
only on the underlying predicate activity would not.”118
B. Illinois’ RICO Statute in Action
The restrictions set forth by the legislator have been effective in
limiting the reach of the RICO statute. To date, the implementation of
the Illinois RICO statute has not resulted in an overly broad attack on
criminal liability in Illinois. While certain states have modeled their
RICO statutes after the federal version, and often broaden its reach,
Illinois has done the exact opposite, extremely limiting its
applicability.
Illinois’ RICO statute is narrower than those enacted by other
states in several ways. First, the statute is limited to street gangs, as
evidenced by the title of the statute.119 Second, Illinois requires at
least three predicate acts to establish a “pattern of predicate activ-
ity.”120 Additionally, Illinois requires that these predicate acts occur
after June 11, 2012 (the statute’s enactment), and that the last predi-
cate act occurs within three years of the first predicate act.121 The fed-
eral RICO Act only requires two predicate acts and up to ten years
between acts.122 Thirdly, Illinois requires all of these predicate acts to
be Class 2 felonies or higher.123
Illinois also included a definition for operation and management,
unlike the federal RICO Act.124 Under federal RICO Act, the federal
court’s interpretation of operation and management has created issues
as to how far down the chain of command the government may reach
when using RICO.125 Illinois defined operation and management as
“directing or carrying out the enterprise’s affairs and is limited to any
person who knowingly serves as a leader, organizer, operator, man-
ager, director, supervisor, financier, advisor, recruiter, supplier, or en-
117. Id.
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-4(f) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
119. Id. 5/33G-1.
120. Id. 5/33G-3(f)(1).
121. Id. 5/33G-3(f)(2).
122. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
123. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(e) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
124. Id. 5/33G-3(d).
125. CRIMINAL RICO MANUAL, supra note 3, at 89, 98, 156.
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forcer of an enterprise in violation of this Article.”126 By adding the
mens rea requirement of knowingly, the Illinois legislature limited the
statute’s application to those higher up within the organization.
On December 2, 2017, approximately six years after its enactment,
the first convictions were returned under the Illinois RICO statute.127
A jury found six leaders of the Black Souls, a street gang located in
the West Garfield Park neighborhood of Chicago, guilty of racketeer-
ing conspiracy and drug conspiracy.128 These convictions were a culmi-
nation of an investigation that started months prior to June 13, 2013,
when police arrested forty-one members of the Black Souls street
gang.129 Twenty of these members were subsequently charged with
criminal enterprise as to the Black Souls street gang, murder, witness
intimidation, drug trafficking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and illegal
weapons offenses.130 Of the twenty gang members originally charged,
14 pled guilty.131
Among the six brought to trial were Cornell Dawson, the leader of
the Black Souls; Teron Odum, Dawson’s second-in command; Duavon
Spears, a gang enforcer; and three additional trusted advisers and
managers.132 These top members of the Black Souls terrorized and
controlled with “an iron fist” an area in East Garfield Park, which
consisted of a few square blocks.133 The Black Souls’ gang operation
was similar to that of a corporation—fully equipped with a manage-
ment hierarchy, sales quotas, and corresponding rules.134 The gang
was estimated to have been netting as much as $11 million in the East
Garfield Park drug market.135
Ultimately, the jury found that at least four murders were commit-
ted by the Black Souls to protect their drug operation and as retalia-
126. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33G-3(d) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
127. Megan Crepeau, Six Black Souls Gang Leaders Convicted in Cook County’s First Test of
State RICO Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-met-black-souls-gang-trial-20171130-story.html.
128. Id.
129. Jason Meisner, Black Souls Gang Leaders Ordered Held Without Bail, CHICAGO TRIB-
UNE (June 14, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-06-14-chi-black-souls-
gang-leaders-ordered-held-without-bail-20130614-story.html.
130. Megan Crepeau, Black Souls Gang Trial Goes to Jury in Cook County’s First Test of State
Racketeering Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/lo
cal/breaking/ct-met-black-souls-gang-racketeering-trial-20171127-story.html.
131. Id.
132. Crepeau, supra note 127.
133. Megan Crepeau, Six reputed gang leaders go on trial in first test of state racketeering law,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-black-
souls-gang-rico-trial-20171002-story.html.
134. Grimm, supra note 87.
135. Id.
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tion against rival gangs.136 One of the murders occurred on October
20, 2012, when Claude Snulligan was executed in broad daylight on
the Westside of Chicago by the Black Souls.137 Two months prior,
Snulligan refused to accept a bribe and cooperate with leaders of the
Black Souls in a pending aggravated battery case against Teron
Odum.138
On June 1, 2018, all six members of the Black Souls who were con-
victed at trial under the state RICO statute were sentenced to life in
prison.139 Each of the six defendants were sentenced to life in prison
for the RICO charge and to consecutive forty-year terms for narcotics
conspiracy.140 Kimberly M. Foxx, Cook County State’s Attorney,
stated:
The sentences imposed by the Court hold the defendants accounta-
ble for their roles as leaders of the violent Black Souls street gang
and for their participation in murders, attempted murders, shoot-
ings, kidnappings, beatings and drug trafficking. The severity of
these sentences will not only protect the community from these de-
fendants, but also send a strong message to the leaders of other vio-
lent gangs that they will be held accountable. I want to thank our
law enforcement partners on this case, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment and Federal Bureau of Investigation, who tirelessly worked to
bring the leaders of the Black Souls to justice. My office is commit-
ted to working with our law enforcement partners to bring addi-
tional prosecutions like this one that strategically target violent
offenders preying on communities already ravaged by violent crime
and drugs.141
On October 30, 2014, the first set of arrests in Lake County, Illinois
under the Illinois RICO statute took place when twenty-one members
of the Four Corners Hustlers street gang were arrested.142 The investi-
gation, beginning in January 2014, referred to as “Operation Shut
Down the Hustle,” resulted in the recovery of large amounts of guns,
cars, money, heroin, cocaine, prescription pills, and marijuana.143 The
twenty-one gang members were subsequently charged with murder
and trafficking heroin, cocaine, and prescription drugs, in addition to
136. Six Sentenced To Life In Prison In Black Souls Rico Trial, COOK COUNTY STATE’S AT-
TORNEY (June 1, 2018), https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/news/six-sentenced-life-
prison-black-souls-rico-trial.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Sobol, supra note 1.
140. Six Sentenced To Life In Prison In Black Souls Rico Trial, supra note 136.
141. Id.
142. Michelle Groenke, Lake County Charges 21 Under RICO Statute, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/mundelein/ct-rico-arrests-lake-county-
met-20141031-story.html.
143. Id.
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other offenses.144 Lake County State’s Attorney Mike Nerheim com-
mented that these were the first charges brought under the Illinois
State RICO statute in Lake County, and that “anybody involved in
street gang activity should know that it will not be the last.”145
One strength of Illinois’ RICO statute is its ability to incorporate a
prosecutor’s involvement at the earliest stages of an investigation.146
The relationship between a local prosecutor’s office and local law en-
forcement is generally much better than the relationship between lo-
cal law enforcement personnel and federal prosecutors. Local
prosecutors are able to assist local law enforcement officers by provid-
ing legal guidance for investigating complex offenses, such as those
targeted by the RICO statute.147 Additionally, prosecutors are able to
improve and implement the evidence collection procedures.148 Prose-
cutors have a better understanding of what types of evidence and in-
formation is required to result in a successful RICO prosecution.149
However, one main issue for prosecuting RICO cases at the state
level is that these cases can be extremely complex.150 This complexity
is felt at all levels, and can create confusion for the jury, the attorneys,
and even the judges.151 This complexity creates doubt in a prosecu-
tor’s ability to successfully bring RICO charges to a conviction. Prose-
cutors may not want to put themselves in the middle of developing
such important case law, since Illinois’ RICO statute is just now being
tested in the courts.152 This results in only the strongest cases being
brought to trial, while other cases that could be established under
RICO, are instead brought under a variety of individual state stat-
utes.153 Charges may be downgraded or even dropped to avoid bring-
ing RICO charges.154
C. Comparisons
It is clear after looking at the legislative history of both New York’s
OCCA and Illinois’ RICO statute, that both were designed to be simi-
lar in purpose, but more limited in scope than the federal RICO Act.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Rebovich et al., supra note 41, at 21.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 21–22.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Id.
152. Rebovich et al., supra note 41, at 15.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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In drafting their respective RICO statues, New York and Illinois had
years of federal RICO history to review and dissect and decide what
protections, limitations, and restrictions they wanted to implement.
1. Enterprise
The most critical departure that both New York and Illinois make
from the federal RICO Act is that the criminal enterprise must be an
ascertainable structure distinct from the underlying pattern of crimi-
nal activity. For example, under the federal RICO Act, the pattern of
racketeering activity itself may constitute the criminal enterprise, but
in New York and Illinois the criminal enterprise must exist outside of
the pattern of criminal activity. The federal RICO Act allows an indi-
vidual to be convicted of RICO violations, without the prosecutor be-
ing required to prove that the underlying predicate activity was in
furtherance of a criminal enterprise.
A common fear among the New York and Illinois legislature was
state prosecutorial abuse with such a broad sweeping statute as the
federal RICO Act. Legislators in both states shared the concern that
state prosecutors would inappropriately and indiscriminately use such
a broad reaching statute to prosecute individuals who had very little to
no connection to a criminal enterprise. Both states wanted to ensure
that such individuals would not be charged with RICO violations, and
be subject to the severe sentencing that comes with those violations,
unless they knowingly advanced a criminal enterprise in the course of
committing the underlying criminal predicate activity. Representative
Andre´ Thapedi explained on the House floor:
What RICO does is it does increase the mandatory minimum
sentences and sentences ranging in a major way. But since we al-
ready have serious sentences for these serious crimes, the biggest
impact of RICO is to create huge penalties for the smaller players in
drug conspiracies. Is it the Legislature’s goal to incarcerate these
little guys in large conspiracies for huge amounts of time? Those
legislators who feel that the social benefits of increased incarcera-
tion outweigh the huge costs for the investigation, trial and incarcer-
ation that will result from this Bill should in fact support RICO.
There is no question about that.
But here’s how RICO gets the little guys. Law enforcement arrests
the small dealers, the small gang members and then threaten them
with huge RICO consequences. They will threaten and squeeze
these little guys and some of them will then become cooperators,
wear wires and testify against other gang members and leaders in
particular. The police will obtain eavesdropping orders based upon
these statements of these little people. They listen to the conversa-
tions of the leaders for a month or two, draw a circle around every-
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 22  7-MAY-20 12:21
848 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:827
one who buys or sells for the kingpin and charge everyone within
that circle, be it large or small, with the overreaching drug conspir-
acy and with each member potentially on the line for the full
amount of drugs bought and sold by the full group. This means that
the indictment of 6, 10, 15, 20 or 65 defendants in the conspiracy will
allow the conflicting of all but 1 or 2 defendants at trial. That is a
problem. So, while this is definitely a powerful tool for law enforce-
ment and if that is the sole priority for the Legislators, then they
should vote for it. But here is the real reason to oppose it. The fed-
eral experience has taught us that capitalism is a wonderful thing.
When you remove a supplier from the marketplace but demand re-
mains the same, the new suppliers are going to step up and fill the
void. This is what has happened as a result of the RICO cases. So,
again, I understand what Anita Alvarez wants to do. I understand
what you’re doing, Mr. Zalewski, I have a lot of respect for you. But
I think that we should all recognize what RICO truly is and its
implications.155
2. Pattern of Criminal Activity
As noted above, under the federal RICO Act a person commits a
pattern of racketeering activity by committing at least two predicate
acts: the first of which has to have occurred after October 15, 1970,
and the last occurring within ten years of a prior act of racketeering
activity.156 Vaguely drafted, Congress left it to the courts to clarify the
“pattern of racketeering activity” requirement.157 In 1989, nineteen
years later, the Supreme Court finally held that, “[i]n order to prove a
pattern of racketeering activity, a plaintiff or prosecutor must show at
least two racketeering predicates that are related and that amount to,
or threaten the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.”158
In a significant departure from the federal RICO Act, New York
and Illinois both require three predicate activities.159 Illinois takes it a
step further, requiring that the three predicate acts be within a three-
year timeframe.160 Both New York and the federal RICO Act require
those acts be within ten years, although New York does require three
predicate acts like Illinois.161Additionally, state prosecutors in New
York and Illinois, not only have to prove that an individual committed
155. Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 20.
156. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-130).
157. Id.
158. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 229 (1989).
159. See Kessler, supra note 56, at 809; Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 12.
160. See Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 111 (quoting Sen. Raoul).
161. See Ill. H. Transcription Deb., supra note 23, at 20.
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the three predicate acts, but also that individual’s role in the wider
criminal enterprise and the connection to those predicate acts.162
III. IMPACT
Because Illinois’ RICO statute is in its infancy and has yet to be
tested in the appellate courts, Illinois trial courts might be tempted to
look to federal court opinions interpreting language from the federal
RICO act for persuasive guidance. However, this can be a mistake
when a state’s RICO statute is tailored in a much narrower fashion,
and is designed to target a very specific type of criminal activity.163
This Part suggests that Illinois trial courts should look to other state
court interpretations of similarly enacted state RICO statutes that are
more closely constructed to Illinois’ RICO statute than the federal
RICO Act. This Part further suggests that because Illinois’ RICO stat-
ute is similar in structure, design, and legislative history and intent to
New York’s OCCA, it can be instructive to look to the OCCA for
possible persuasive guidance and what to expect from Illinois’ RICO
statute in the future.
New York’s OCCA and Illinois’ RICO statute have a similar begin-
ning. OCCA, enacted in 1986, had only one case brought to trial
under it by 1990, which resulted in an acquittal.164 In the first four
years of OCCA, only seven indictments had been filed.165 One reason
thought to be inhibiting the use of OCCA is its similar safeguards to
Illinois’ RICO statute. The District Attorney, equivalent to Illinois’
State Attorney, must file a special information stating that they had
reviewed charges and they are in line with the legislative intent behind
the OCCA.166 The district attorney then must receive the consent of
any other district attorney in the state that may be affected or have
concurrent jurisdiction over the criminal conduct.167
In the early application of OCCA, New York courts looked to the
federal RICO act for guidance given the lack of state authority availa-
ble.168 In 2012, the Court of Appeals of New York drew a line in the
sand and made clear that “OCCA, unlike RICO. . . specifically de-
mands that the structure be distinct from the predicate illicit pattern,
162. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(4)(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2008); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/33G-3(b)(2)(C) (2012 & Supp. 2019); Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 90, at 108.
163. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249.
164. See Kessler, supra note 56, at 803.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Michael Scotto, N.Y.’s Organized Crime Control Act After 25 Years, N.Y.L. J. ONLINE
(Feb. 11, 2013).
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and not surprisingly there are no New York cases in which the requi-
site structure has been inferred simply from an underlying pattern.”169
CONCLUSION
The future of Illinois’ RICO statute appears bleak. It’s tough on
paper but fails to flex its muscles in reality. There is a clear separation
between the policy makers and policy implementers, resulting in the
statute’s purpose not being actualized due to its lack of use. Due to its
lack of use, the statute is rarely being tested in the courts, something
that would provide state prosecutors a better roadmap on how to pro-
ceed on future RICO prosecutions.
However, when the time comes, Illinois trial courts should look to
other state court interpretations of similarly enacted state RICO stat-
utes that are more closely constructed to Illinois’ RICO statute, rather
than the federal RICO Act. Because Illinois’ RICO statute is similar
in structure, design, and legislative history and intent to New York’s
OCCA, it can be more instructive to look to the OCCA for persuasive
guidance and what to expect from Illinois’ RICO statute in the future.
When RICO cases are charged and analyzed in Illinois courts, it is
important for those courts to understand that Illinois’s legislators’ in-
tent was fundamentally different than that of Congress in 1970. As
noted above, Illinois’ legislators demanded a narrower reach than fed-
eral RICO and more restraint from prosecutors. Illinois’ RICO stat-
ute was specifically created to be used restrictively, not expansively.
Derek Keenan
169. People v. Western Express Int’l, 19 N.Y.3d 652, 659–660 (2012).
